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Imagine a trip to Disneyland. Parking is painful, the price of admission is steep, and the lines are long. However, the rides are exhilarating, the grounds are immaculate, and everyone around you seems to be smiling. You leave Disneyland with distinctly mixed emotions-happy with some parts of the experience, but disappointed with others. How will you recall your Disneyland experience a week later? Will you remember the mixed emotions you experienced?
Or, will the memory of those mixed emotions fade? Indeed, many of life's most important events are defined by mixtures of emotions where people find themselves feeling both positive and negative emotions. Consider graduating from college ("I'm making progress, but leaving my friends and family"), moving ("I'm starting a new life, but losing my old one"), or achieving major life goals ("I'm thrilled to have reached the destination, but I'm sad the journey is over"). Increasingly, researchers have begun to explore the nature of these mixed emotional experiences. One stream of research has explored whether people can feel positive and negative emotions simultaneously. This research suggests that mixed emotions can be jointly experienced (e.g., Priester and Petty 1996; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995) , particularly during periods of transition (e.g., moving out of a college dorm) and when exposed to specific stimuli (e.g., watching the film "Life is Beautiful; " Larsen, McGraw, and Cacioppo 2001) . Another stream of research has explored when people are more likely to experience mixed emotions (Williams and Aaker 2002) . This research reveals that both chronic individual differences and situational factors increase the likelihood that mixed emotions are felt (e.g., Fong and Tiedens 2002; Pratt 2000) . Culture, for example, appears to be one important moderator. Specifically, cultures that embrace Confucian and Buddhist philosophies tend to foster more experiences of mixed emotions relative to cultures influenced by the Enlightenment and Christianity (Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi 1999) .
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However, neither stream of research has addressed the question of how mixed emotions (i.e., emotional states defined by both positive and negative emotions) are recalled later, leaving unanswered many foundational questions regarding the nature of mixed emotional experiences.
How are mixed emotions remembered? What distinguishes memory for mixed versus unipolar emotions? How does the memory of mixed emotions change over time? These questions are important because decisions about the future are determined less by the online emotion experience than by the memory of the emotion experience (e.g., Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, and Diener 2003) . Indeed, these questions are of particular interest to consumer researchers. By understanding how mixed emotions are remembered, consumer researchers can better understand the conditions under which consumers are likely to: (a) be satisfied or dissatisfied with a product or service; (b) seek to repeat a product or service experience; and (c) recommend or criticize a product or service to other consumers.
RECALLING EMOTIONS
A truism of psychological theory is that memory is not a direct copy of the past but is instead reconstructive (Loftus and Loftus 1980; Schacter 1996) . To recall memories, people use a variety of cues that help them draw inferences about past experiences (Robinson and Clore 2002) . For example, when people are asked to recall what their attitude toward a person or issue was five years ago, they ask themselves (a) what their attitude is now, and then (b) whether there is any reason to believe they felt differently then than they do now (Ross and Conway 1986) . If not, they assume their attitudes have not changed.
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A similar process has been demonstrated with respect to recalling emotions. To illustrate, women who currently believe that menstruation is particularly painful show a bias towards remembering more intense negative emotions during menstruation than they actually experienced (McFarland, Ross, and DeCourville 1989) . Thus, current beliefs (e.g., the belief that menstruation is associated with unpleasant physical and psychological symptoms) can color the memory of prior emotion experiences. Over time, people rely less on episodic memories of emotion experiences that link their recall to specific details of the situation and more on semantic cues that link their recall to general beliefs and theories (Robinson and Clore 2002) . Accordingly, memories of emotions are often inaccurate reflections of online experiences (Thomas and Diener 1990; Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2001; Wirtz et al. 2003) . Sometimes the distortion of past emotional events reflects a positive bias (i.e., a "rosy glow"), whereby the recall of emotions becomes more positive and less negative than the actual emotion experience was (Gilbert et al. 1998) . One reason for the positive bias is that, although the disappointments and distractions felt during an experience can reduce the enjoyment of the moment, they may not reduce the enjoyment of the memory since those disappointments and distractions are fleeting (Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, and Cronk 1997) . For example, parents remember time spent with their children as their happiest moments, even though experience-sampling data suggests otherwise (Kahneman et al. 2004) . Consider the aforementioned trip to Disneyland. The mixed emotions you experienced may not be well-remembered. Rather, you may recall your Disneyland trip more positively, perhaps because of the well-advertised belief that Disneyland is the "happiest place on earth" (Sutton 1992) or because the last emotion you felt on the trip was positive (Lau-Gesk 2005) .
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Memories of emotions can also become more negative over time. For example, individuals with low self-esteem (Christensen, Wood, and Barrett 2003) or who describe themselves as neurotic (Barrett 1997 ) recall experiencing more negative emotions than they reported at the time. Accurate recall of past negative emotions is particularly difficult when one's current belief system supports the negative bias. For instance, Gore supporters recalled that they were unhappier right after the 2004 election than they actually were -perhaps because they were recalling how unhappy they were through the lens of their current, unrationalized view (e.g., "Gore would have been a much better president; I must have been really unhappy when he lost; . Further, in conditions where the "peak" or "end" of an online experience is negative, people often remember that overall experience as more negative than it actually was (Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993) . Thus, in the context of Disneyland, this line of research would suggest that your trip would be recalled more negatively if (a) your current attitude toward Disneyland is negative or (b) the last emotion you felt when you visited Disneyland was negative (e.g., frustration due to overly-fatigued children or parking lot traffic).
In sum, research on the memory of emotions indicates that, over time, people tend to provide more unipolar assessments of recalled emotions, either more negative or more positive (Thomas and Diener 1990) . And, the tendency to provide more unipolar assessments of recalled emotions appears to be a function of the different kinds of information people attend to when making evaluations online versus retrospectively (Robinson and Clore 2002) .
Building on this work, we focus on the memory of mixed emotional experiences. We predict that, relative to unipolar emotions, mixed emotions are difficult to recall accurately, and are generally under-reported at the time of recall. Underlying this prediction is the premise that, in the case of unipolar emotions, the information that people attend to online is uniform--mostly 8 all positive or all negative. Thus, any information recalled to construct an evaluation should have the same valence. The case of mixed emotions differs sharply. With mixed emotional experiences, the information people attend to online is a blend of positive and negative information. When considering such mixed information, people often react by feeling conflicted and uncomfortable (Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1997; Priester and Petty 1996) . In fact, this discomfort can trigger coping strategies to reduce or resolve the feelings of conflict (Folkman et al. 1986 ). People often reappraise the underlying elements causing their mixed emotions (Zanna and Cooper 1974) , change certain emotions in real time via "deep acting" (Hochschild 1983 ), or recognize and accept the co-occurrence of positive and negative emotions (Larsen et al. 2001) . In contrast, such felt conflict does not typically arise when feeling unipolar emotions, even negative emotions (Williams and Aaker 2002) .
However, it is important to note that not all people feel conflicted when experiencing mixed emotions. The degree to which people are concerned with attitudinal consistency or the social desirability of their behaviors enhances the chance that mixed emotions arouse discomfort (Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom 1995; Festinger 1957 ). More generally, whether an individual feels discomfort when feeling mixed emotions appears to be contingent on their general propensity to accept duality (LaBouvie-Vief, DeVoe, and Bulka 1989) and to think in abstract ways (e.g., Hong and Lee 2007) . Asian Americans, for example, are more likely to acknowledge and accept psychological contradiction compared to individuals from North America (Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, and Hou 2004). As a result, Anglo-Americans are more likely to feel conflicted than Asian Americans are when viewing messages highlighting mixed emotions (e.g., both happiness and sadness) (Williams and Aaker 2002) .
Thus, we predict that, in comparison to unipolar emotions such as happiness or sadness, mixed emotions are more difficult to recall accurately. Specifically, we predict that the memory of mixed emotions fades over time, whereby mixed emotions are recalled as less intense than they were experienced. We believe that one underlying reason for this effect is that mixed (vs. unipolar) emotions are more likely to spur feelings of conflict, thereby increasing the chance that people will revise their views of their mixed emotional experiences. If so, we should be able to capture evidence of this mechanism both with tests of mediation relying on measures of felt conflict, as well as tests of moderation relying on culture as an independent variable. In sum, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to unipolar emotions, mixed emotions are more difficult to recall accurately.
Hypothesis 2:
Compared to unipolar emotions, mixed emotions are more likely to be recalled as less intense than they were experienced.
Hypothesis 3: Feelings of conflict resulting from a mixed emotional experience underlie the decreases in the intensity of mixed emotions in recall over time.
Hypothesis 4: Culture moderates the effect of emotion content on recall, whereby AngloAmericans are more likely than Asian Americans to recall mixed emotions as less intense than they were experienced.
To test these hypotheses, we examined the recollection of mixed emotions in three longitudinal experiments. Study 1 was a field study that examines whether mixed emotions are more difficult to recall accurately (relative to unipolar emotions; hypothesis 1) and assesses potential confounds such as importance of emotional experiences. Study 2 demonstrates that the memory of mixed emotions fades over time (hypothesis 2), whereas the recall of unipolar emotions tends to become more intense over time. It also provides initial evidence that feelings of conflict resulting from a mixed emotional experience underlie the decreases in the intensity of mixed emotions in retrospect over time (hypothesis 3), a pattern which does not occur for unipolar emotions. Finally, utilizing measures of felt conflict (hypothesis 3) and tests of moderation (culture as an independent variable; hypothesis 4), Study 3 shows that the feelings of conflict resulting from a mixed emotional experience are indeed associated with the memory decay.
STUDY 1
To test hypothesis 1, we relied on a field study where we asked participants to pursue a health goal of their own choosing. The longitudinal study lasted three weeks. At week 1, participants were asked to select a health-related goal and undertake an extended health-related experience for one week (task definition). At week 2, participants rated their emotions at the end of the experience (emotion experience). At week 3, participants rated their memory of their emotions at week 2 (delayed recall). This three-stage questionnaire structure allowed us to track how the recall of mixed (vs. unipolar) emotions changed over time by comparing emotional responses at time 2 with the memory of them at time 3.
Pretest
To inform stimuli selection and to gain insight into the most effective measures to assess mixed and unipolar emotions, we conducted a pretest (n = 96; M age = 22, 59% female). Paid $3, participants were asked to "recall one event in your own past that you would characterize as creating mixed emotions -i.e., combining positive (e.g., happy) and negative (e.g., sad)
feelings." After writing a short paragraph, participants then responded to the question: "To what degree did this event make you feel mixed emotions?" (All questions anchored by, 0 = not at all, 7 = very much) and to circle how happy (happy, elated, upbeat, good, favorable, satisfied; α= .87) and sad (unhappy, disappointed, depressed, bad, unfavorable, dissatisfied; α= .89) they felt during this event. The emotion items, adapted from the PANAS scales (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988) , were used in the main studies as well.
Reports of mixed emotions were relatively high on average (M = 5.90), with transitions (e.g., break-ups), tests (e.g., mid-terms), personal goals (e.g., health goals) and consumption contexts (e.g., product or service-related) being the most frequently cited mixed experiences. To determine whether recalled mixed emotion is a discrete construct relative to more unipolar happy and sad emotions, we examined the inter-relationship among the three emotion indices. The correlation between degree of recalled mixed emotion and recalled happy emotions was modestly negative (r(93) = -.28, p < .05). The relation between degree of recalled mixed emotion and recalled sad emotions was modestly positive (r(94) = .17, p < .10). Thus, the recalled mixed emotions were largely, but not completely, independent of both happy and sad emotions, indicating discriminant validity for the mixed emotional reports. Of note, when we operationalized emotional ambivalence where the extent to which opposing reactions towards the event are (a) similar in degree (similarity) and (b) extreme (intensity) (Thompson et al. 1995) , the results were not qualitatively different than the results found with the mixed emotion item. Thus, in the main studies, we focused on the mixed emotion item as the measure to assess mixedness.
Method
A total of 102 graduate students at a large West Coast university volunteered to take part in a study on their own health goals. Seventy students (M age = 29, 60% female) completed all three stages of data collection: task definition, emotion experience, and delayed recall.
Participants were presented with the cover story which stated that a recent study conducted at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government had found that 88% of Americans have a health goal. Asked to focus on their own personal health goals, participants read: "Please choose a goal to improve your health in the short term -over the course of the next week. Your goal should relate to whatever is important and relevant to you. For example, your overall goal may be to reduce stress, enhance general fitness, and improve your diet. It could be any goal of your choosing -as long as it has a specific measurable standard of success. Please circle the type of health goal you would like to focus on this week: stress reduction, general fitness, or diet."
After participants circled the domain of their personal health goal, they read the following, "Many researchers have shown that to achieve your goal, small steps are needed. By identifying some small steps you could take to achieve your goal, the chance of achieving the goal is heightened. For example, if your goal is general fitness, you may decide to drink eight glasses of water each day. Identifying such small steps you could take toward your goal also benefits as it sets up a specific measurable standard of success (i.e., did you indeed drink eight glasses of water each day?). Since this study is a week-long study, please write down some small 13 steps you could take to work toward your selected health goal. Some examples: For stress relief, you might decide to take the time to go on a short walk each day of this week. For general fitness, you may decide to use the stairs instead of the elevator this week. If diet or weight loss is your goal, limiting the alcoholic beverages you drink this week may be a strategy you choose.
Please write down one small step that you would like to take in order to achieve your goal (circled above) -something that you could envision doing for a week." To preserve anonymity and to link the questionnaires across time, each participant chose a codename. They then wrote down their one small step. Last, they reported demographic information.
At time 2 (one week after time 1), participants were re-contacted in a classroom setting for their report of their actual experience. Participants were asked to recall their codename, the category of the personal health goal chosen (stress relief, general fitness or diet), and the small step that they wanted to take toward their goal. Participants were then asked to, "Please circle the emotion that best describes how you feel about how you did." They were given three choices: "Happy," "Mixed (both a bit happy and sad)," and "Sad."
Finally, at time 3 (one week after time 2), participants were reminded that they (a) had completed a questionnaire on health goals the prior week, and (b) had circled an emotion that described how they felt they did in terms of reaching their goal. Participants were then asked if they would be willing to answer some additional questions regarding their memory of last week's (i.e., time 2) questionnaire. Participants were asked to recall their codename, the category of health goal chosen (stress relief, general fitness or diet), and the small step that they had wanted to take toward the health goal. Next, they were asked: "Using the scales below, please circle how you felt one week ago [bold in original] ." After receiving clarification that their ratings were not to be of their current emotions but rather of their recollections of last week's emotions, participants were given the same three choices as in the previous week: Happy, Mixed (both a bit happy and sad), and Sad. Participants were next asked to, "Please circle how difficult was it to remember your feelings from one week ago" (0 = not at all difficult/hard, 7 = very difficult/hard; Recall Difficulty Index, r = .96). Finally, they circled how important their health goal was to them (0 = not at all important/significant, 7 = very important/significant; Importance Index, r = .96). Participants were debriefed one week after time 3.
Results and Discussion
To test hypothesis 1, our analysis focused on the time 3 data, testing for differences among people who had experienced different emotions after attempting a small step towards changing their health. Of note, most of the participants reported feeling happy (n = 23) or mixed (n = 28); few reported feeling sad (n = 7). Further, the correlation between experienced mixed emotion and experienced happy emotions was small (r(50) = .11, p >.25), as was the correlation with experienced negative emotions (r(50) = .22, p > .10). Thus, the experienced mixed emotions were largely independent of both unipolar emotions, indicating discriminant validity for the mixed emotion reports. This pattern held true for recalled mixed emotions and recalled positive emotions (r(52) = .16, p > .25), though the recalled mixed emotions were moderately related to recalled negative emotions (r(51) = .55, p < .001).
An ANOVA on the Recall Difficulty Index at time 3 confirmed that those who felt mixed had considerably more difficulty remembering their emotions from time 2 (M = 4.14), compared to those who reported feeling happy (M = 2.96) or sad (M = 2.00; Helmert contrast F(1, 55) = 5.27, p < .01). Further, the importance of the health goal did not differ across the three cells 15 (M mixed = 5.34, M happy = 5.63, M sad = 5.00; F < 1). The comparisons on the Recall Difficulty Index remained significant even when importance was included as a covariate.
Thus, the results of study 1 suggest that mixed emotional experiences are relatively difficult to recall compared to unipolar emotions. This effect is not driven by differential levels of importance for the distinct types of emotion experiences. In study 2, we directly examine the recall bias present in the memory of mixed versus unipolar emotions, and whether mixed versus unipolar emotions may be associated with greater levels of felt conflict.
STUDY 2
The main objective of study 2 was two-fold. First, we examined the possibility that memory for mixed emotions changes over time more so than that of unipolar emotions. Second, we explore whether such an effect might be associated with an increase in feelings of conflict when experiencing mixed emotions. In study 2, we relied on a test-taking experience, a context chosen because it often evokes strong mixed emotions (Safer, Levine, and Drapalski 2002) . Indeed, our study 1 pretest revealed that, after break-ups, test-taking was the most commonly cited mixed emotional experience mentioned (e.g., "I got a high grade on my last midterm while my friend who is also in the class got a poor grade," "Relieved that the test was over with and that I could either go home or relax, but disappointed or scared about exam results or tests coming up").
Method
One hundred and four MBA students (M age = 29, 48% female), who were enrolled in a consumer behavior course at a West Coast university, volunteered to take part in the study. A total of 14 individuals were absent during the follow-up dates. Thus, 90 participants completed the study, which stretched over three weeks (M age = 29, 47% female).
In the middle of an 11-week long class, students took a midterm exam. Grades were returned the following week. The first wave of data collection took place when the graded exam was returned. The instructor wrote three test score ranges on the board at the front of the class (range 1 = above average, range 2 = around average, and range 3 = below average), and then handed back the exams. After reviewing their exams, participants received a questionnaire where they were asked to indicate the range that included their score as well as a codename (to preserve anonymity and to allow the data to be linked across weeks). Of the 86 participants who reported their range, 43 scored within the "average range," 23 scored "better than average," and 20 scored "worse than average." Next, participants were asked to rate the degree to which they felt mixed emotions (0 = not at all; 7 = very much). They were also asked to complete the identical happy and sad emotions items asked in the pretest. We also included a new measure where participants rated the degree to which they "felt conflicted" when they got their midterm back and saw their score (0 = not at all conflicted; 7 = very conflicted).
Time 2 took place two weeks after their graded exam was returned. Participants were asked to recall their exam range and then asked to, "Please circle how you felt when you got your midterm back and saw your score." The same emotions measured at time 1 were measured at time 2. Participants were fully debriefed the following week.
Results and Discussion
Reliability of the multi-item scales was high for both reports of actual emotions at time 1 (α= .87 for happy; α= .92 for sad) and reports of recalled emotions at time 2 (α= .92 for happy; α= .91 for sad).
We began by examining the correlations between unipolar and mixed emotions. Once again, these correlations revealed that the mixed emotion report was distinct from the unipolar emotion reports. The unipolar emotions strongly reflect the relative "success" of the exam score.
For example, experienced happy emotions correlated .74 with actual score (p < .001) and experienced sad emotions correlated -.66 with the score (p < .001). Further, recalled happy emotions correlated .74 with the score (p < .001) and recalled sad emotions correlated -.67 with the score (p < .001). However, mixed emotions were uncorrelated with success both immediately after the experience (r(81) = .15, ns) and after the delay (r(81) = .09, ns). Moreover, mixed emotions were only modestly correlated with the unipolar emotions at both the time of exam return (r = -.17, ns, for happy emotions, and r = .37, p < .01 for sad emotions) and at the time of recall (r = -.15, ns, for happy emotions and r = .37, p < .01 for sad emotions), mirroring the pattern found in study 1. At both the time of experience and the time of recall, positive and negative emotions were highly negatively correlated (rs = -.76 and -.75, p < .001).
Our primary analyses were conducted using an ANOVA with 2 fixed repeated factors: one 2-level factor (time: response at time of exam return or recall) and one 3-level factor (emotion: mixed, happy, and sad emotional responses). This analysis directly tests whether the mixed emotions are recalled less accurately than the two unipolar emotions. This ANOVA revealed no main effect of time (F(1, 164 = .88, p > .35) or emotion (F(2, 164 = .72, p > .40), but did reveal the hypothesized interaction (F(2, 164) = 5.51, p < .001). A planned set of Helmert contrasts on the emotions factor showed that the interaction was driven by the comparison between the mixed emotion measures, which decreased between times 1 and 2 (M = 3.97 at exam return vs. M = 3.43 at recall), and the two unipolar emotion measures, which both increased slightly between times 1 and 2 (M = 3.38 at exam return vs. 3.50 at recall for happy emotions, and M = 3.02 at exam return vs. 3.14 at recall for sad emotions). The contrast representing this comparison was highly significant (F(1, 82) = 7.43, p < . 001), thereby supporting hypothesis 2.
In contrast, the orthogonal contrast comparing the degree of change in the two unipolar measures was not significant (F(1, 82) = 0.01, p > .90). Simple effects tests revealed that both the reduction in mixed emotions and the increase in unipolar emotions were significant (t(82) = 2.24, p < .05 for mixed emotions, and t(81) = 2.15, p < .05 for the combined measure of unipolar emotions). Note that none of the above results were qualified by any interaction with a 3-level between-subjects factor indicating how well participants had actually scored on the exam (worse, average, and better), an effect that dovetails with prior findings (e.g., Jones, Yurak, and Frisch 1997, study 3). There were no differences in variances of the reported mood measures across time, allowing a clear interpretation of the mean differences that were found.
So far, our analysis has focused on accuracy at a mean level. We also compared the accuracy of recall from a correlational perspective. If recall perfectly mirrors actual experience, the regression equation predicting recalled level from actual level would have an intercept of 0 and a slope coefficient of 1. In fact, results of the over time regressions for the two measures of unipolar emotions were very close to this pattern of accurate recall. In particular, for happy emotions, the intercept was .27 (ns) and the slope was .96 (p < .001). For sad emotions, the intercept was .21 (ns) and the slope was .97 (p < .001). In contrast, for mixed emotions the intercept was 1.11 (p < .001) and the slope was .54 (p < .001), indicating considerably reduced accuracy and more noise than that found for the unipolar emotions.
Finally, we examined the correlation between the felt conflict measure and mixed emotions, as well as that of the felt conflict measure and unipolar emotions, all at time 1. The correlation between conflicted and mixed emotions was significant (r = .90; p < .001).
Dramatically lower were the correlations between conflicted and happy emotions (r = -.19; p < .07) and between conflicted and sad emotions (r = .39; p < .001). These results suggest a close link between mixed emotions and felt conflict, suggesting close proximity on the causal chain.
More importantly, however, they provide initial support for the premise that mixed emotions are in fact more highly associated with felt conflict than are unipolar emotions.
In sum, regardless of how participants actually did on the exam, they reported moderately high levels of mixed emotions when their graded exam was returned to them. However, their memory of those mixed emotions faded over time. This pattern did not occur with unipolar emotions. Further, empirical support was found for the premise that people feel more conflicted when experiencing mixed emotional experiences versus unipolar emotion experiences.
We then examined whether the recall bias for mixed emotions was mediated by changes in perceived conflict, using the within-subject mediation test (Judd, Kenny and McClelland 2001) . This test determines whether the change from experience to recall in mixed emotions is accounted for by a concomitant change in felt conflict. Assuming a significant change over time in the dependent variable (mixed emotions, as shown above) and a significant change over time in the assumed mediator (conflict, which reveals a marginally significant change over time, t(81) = 1.80, p < .08), the test for within-subject mediation regresses change on the dependent variable on change in the mediator and the sum of the mediator values at time 1 and time 2. When the summed mediator scores are centered, mediation is indicated by a significant coefficient for the mediator change score and a non-significant coefficient for the intercept. As predicted, both conditions were found in our data: the change coefficient for the presumed mediator (felt conflict) was .77, p < .001 (where the coefficient for the intercept was .21, p > .15).
Even with this evidence of mediation, one limitation of study 2 is that it provides only simple correlational support for the link between mixed emotions and felt conflict. The mediational link between the decay of memory for mixed emotions and felt conflict that was found was established on a longitudinal, but not experimental, basis. Thus, to delve deeper into this process, we made two changes to the experimental paradigm used in study 3. Specifically, since individuals with an East Asian (vs. North American) background experience less conflict due to mixed emotions, they should have more accurate memory for mixed emotions (hypothesis 4). Second, rather than relying on measures to capture the degree to which an emotion experience was mixed or unipolar, we experimentally manipulated the emotion stimuli. This change allows us to make stronger causal inferences in both our moderating (culture) and our mediating (felt conflict) hypotheses.
STUDY 3
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We have argued that feelings of conflict are one reason why memory for mixed emotions fades with time. Accordingly, study 3 included both a measure of conflict for tests of mediation, as well as an independent variable (culture) for a test of moderation of our effects. Our theorizing suggests that felt conflict will be experienced primarily for the Anglo-American respondents, and that the magnitude of felt conflict will predict the degree of bias for recalling mixed emotions.
To shed more light on the pattern of memory for emotions over time, we included two time periods at which mixed emotions were recalled, measuring the memory of the emotions one week after the experience occurred, and again two weeks later.
Method
Participants were MBA students who volunteered to take part in a study at two large West Coast universities over the course of three weeks (n = 45; M age = 28; 54% female).
Students were categorized into two cultural groups based on self-ratings. Anglo-American participants were those who had indicated their ethnic background to be "Caucasian" and their first language English. The Asian American participants were those who had indicated their ethnic background to be Asian or Asian American. The students with complete data included total of 16 Asian American and 29 Anglo-American participants.
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As a cover story, participants were told that researchers were conducting a study to assess consumer responses to potential advertisements. Participants read: "On the next page you will see an example of a potential print advertising message created for a new brand of moving company. Please look at this advertisement and then answer the questionnaire that follows it 22 about that ad and the brand it features." The stimuli involved two advertisements for the fictitious "Transportex Moving Company." Adapted from Williams and Aaker (2002) , the ads were pre-tested to evoke either happy or mixed emotions (both happy and sad). Relying on the same emotions as in study 2 (i.e., felt conflict, mixed emotions, happy emotions, and sad emotions), emotion indices were created for each of the three measurement occasions.
Reliability was high for both happy emotions (α's ranged from .93 to .95) and sad emotions (α's ranged from .78 to .87).
At time 2 (one week after time 1), participants were re-contacted in a classroom setting and read the following: "Last week, you saw an example of a potential print advertising message created for a new brand of moving company: Transportex. We wanted to ask some additional questions. Using the scales below, please circle how you felt one week ago (when you viewed the ad for Transportex Movers)." Again, we clarified that the ratings were not of current emotions but rather recollections of last week's emotions. Participants provided their recollections of their emotions.
Finally, at time 3 (two weeks after time 1), participants were re-contacted in the classroom setting, and read the same instructions as those given in time 2, except that they were reminded that "Two weeks ago, you saw an example of a potential print advertising message" and "to please circle how you felt two weeks ago (when you viewed the ad for Transportex Movers)." Participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
First, to determine the extent to which different emotional experiences were evoked from the appeals, an overall 2 (emotional appeal condition: happy or mixed) x 2 (culture: Asian or Asian-American or Anglo-American) by 2 (gender) ANOVA was conducted on repeated measures across the happiness index, the sadness index, and reports of mixed feelings at time 1.
As expected, there was a highly significant interaction between the emotional appeal condition and the repeated measures factor (F(2, 84) = 8.99, p < .001), such that reported happiness (M = 3.53) was notably higher than either mixed feelings (M = 2.86) or reported sadness (M = 1.84) in the happy appeal condition whereas mixed feelings (M = 4.50) were much higher than either reported happiness (M = 2.91) or reported sadness (M = 2.97) in the mixed appeal condition.
These results demonstrate that the appeals both conveyed the intended emotional content and evoked the intended emotional responses across conditions. Next, we tested the proposition that only Anglo-American participants who experienced mixed emotions would feel conflicted and therefore show a recall bias that systematically diminished their levels of recalled mixed emotions over time. In contrast, Asian American participants who experienced mixed emotions should not feel conflicted, thereby eliminating the memory decay for mixed emotions. (Nor should such a recall bias occur with anyone who experienced happy emotions). We first examined this premise with a series of contrasts within a mixed model ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (emotion and culture) and one withinsubject factor (three levels of time: experience and two follow-up recall measures). Means presented in figure 1 show support for our central prediction. Indeed, the only sizable negative trend across time found was for the linear decline in the mixed emotion measurement for the Anglo-American participants exposed to the mixed emotion appeal (simple effects linear trend:
F(1,12) = 8.56, p <.02; quadratic trend: (F(1,12) = 0.62, p < .40).
Next, we tested the hypothesis that the declining pattern was unique to the AngloAmericans who read the mixed emotion message via two stages. All analyses reported below control for participants' age and gender. In the first stage analysis, the negative linear trend for the mixed emotions reported by the Anglo-American participants in the mixed emotional appeal 25 condition was contrasted with the linear trend for the mixed emotions reported in the other three conditions (Anglo-American participants facing the happy appeal, the Asian American participants facing the mixed appeal, and the Asian American participants facing the happy appeal). The Helmert contrast was highly significant (F(1,39) = 8.59, p < .01).
In the second stage analysis, parallel to the approach taken in study 2, we contrasted the time trend of the mixed and unipolar emotions. In a second-level Helmert contrast, we compared whether the initial Helmert contrast across the four conditions differed for mixed versus the two unipolar emotions. Again, consistent with the patterns shown in the figure, this cross-emotional contrast was significant (p < .02). These results are consistent with hypothesis 2 and set the stage for examining hypotheses 3 and 4.
Our theorizing predicts that experienced conflict will be felt primarily by the AngloAmerican respondents, and that the magnitude of this conflict will predict the degree of recall bias for mixed emotions. In support, a Helmert contrast comparing the degree of conflict experienced in the Anglo-American respondents compared to the other three conditions was significant (F(1,42) = 4.10, p < .05). As predicted, the conflict experienced by the AngloAmerican respondents facing the mixed advertisement was markedly greater (M = 3.77) than that experienced by any other group (Anglo-Americans facing the happy advertisement, M = 2.75; Asian American respondents facing the mixed advertisement, M = 3.00; Asian American respondents facing the happy advertisement, M = 2.98).
Consistent with the next step in a mediating model, felt conflict at time 1 predicted the degree of recall bias across the 3 times (B = .32, p < .01), and continued to predict the recall bias even when the contrast coding to represent the conditions differences was entered (B = .29, p < .01). When felt conflict was added, the coefficient for the Helmert contrast used above declined 26 (from B = .85, p < .05 to B = .61, p > .12). A Sobel test using the modified criterion suggested by MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) was significant (z = 1.41, p < .05).
In summary, felt conflict differed predictably by condition, predicted the degree of memory bias, and the pattern of effects we found for felt conflict was consistent with a model where felt conflict mediated the moderating effect of culture on the recall bias.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of three studies show that mixed emotional experiences are more difficult to recall accurately compared to unipolar emotion experiences. Over time, people tend to remember mixed emotional experiences as less mixed, a memory decay effect which does not occur with unipolar emotion experiences. Moreover, our results show that this decline in memory cannot be explained by differential importance levels across the distinct emotion types. Instead, it appears to be driven by the felt conflict that arises from the experience of mixed emotions. The memory bias is particularly pronounced for Anglo-Americans who tend to feel conflicted when experiencing mixed emotions -and thus should be more motivated to resolve the conflict. The recall bias did not appear for Asian Americans, who are less likely to feel conflicted when experiencing mixed emotions (and thus less motivated to reduce that conflict). Together, these results indicate that, as time passes, mixed emotions are increasingly difficult to recall, that memory for them fades, and that felt conflict underlies this recall bias.
By documenting the systematic underestimation of prior mixed emotions in particular, our research contributes to a growing body of work on the general difficulty people have recalling emotions. Our findings fit well with a number of studies documenting that the 27 memories of emotions are often inaccurate reflections of online experiences (e.g., Gilbert et al. 1998; Loftus and Loftus 1980; Thomas and Diener 1990; Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert 2001; Wirtz et al. 2003) . However, our research departs from this stream by illuminating a directionally distinct effect (memory decay) and a mechanism whereby the mixed emotions give to feelings of conflict. Thus, the recall of mixed emotions is quite distinct than the pattern typically found for that of unipolar emotions.
Delving deeper into the distinctions between mixed emotion and unipolar emotion experiences is still necessary, however. Even if meta-emotional experiences such as the feelings of conflict that arise from having mixed feelings account for the effects found in this research, there may be additional reasons why the recall patterns differ for mixed versus unipolar emotions. For example, people may have implicit theories or cultural scripts about mixed emotions. Consider, as one example, a general lay theory suggesting that mixed emotions must fade over time. In defining memories, people may believe that any emotionally ambiguous occurrences must eventually be "decided." To illustrate, in recalling your wedding day, you may come to think that it was a wholly happy day. After all, you married your true love on that day.
Any mixed feelings you may have had at the time have since been resolved or can be attributed to relatively unimportant things (e.g., wedding-day jitters or the fact that the photographers' camera was stolen during the wedding). In this view, individuals may hold implicit theories of mixed emotions which involve the general belief that, as time passes, emotional truth is learned and mixed feelings may be (or should be) forgotten. Alternatively, people may be more motivated to protect more unipolar happy or sad memories (Zauberman, Ratner, and Kim 2007) .
Future work is needed to investigate whether people hold implicit theories of mixed emotions 28 which might reflect social beliefs or self-deception, and whether such implicit theories might influence memory decay.
The results of this research speak to several discrete domains of research. For example, the results imply that individuals who are comfortable with inconsistency should be more likely to recall mixed emotions accurately (Cialdini et al. 1995) . Relatedly, if there is an increased propensity to resolve the meta-emotion of felt conflict, the effects documented here should be mitigated for individuals who are unlikely to be disturbed by the ambiguity associated with mixed emotions (e.g., older adults, Labouvie-Vief et al. 1989; high-level processors, Hong and Lee 2007) . Similarly, the effects should be muted if the mixed emotions experienced are comprised by a dominant emotion (e.g., strong feelings of anger), thereby reducing the felt conflict experienced (Priester and Petty 1996) . An empirical examination of these possibilities would more fully illuminate when memory decay may happen and when it may not.
Caveats and Implications
This research has several limitations which highlight other opportunities for future research. For example, this research did not consider when and why mixed emotions might be resolved in favor of positive or negative memories. Most of the work on the memory of emotions focuses on experiences where people have distinct theories that "pull" their reconstruction one way or another (Thomas and Diener 1990) . This is not the case in the current research. If motivation to pull the memory of mixed emotions toward the positive or negative were present, we might have observed a more polarizing set of results, whereby recall of mixed emotions still fades but is replaced by positive (or negative) memories.
Another limitation of this research is its neglect of the exact nature of the felt conflict (Priester, Petty, and Park 2006) . Is felt conflict, discomfort, disharmony, or confusion associated with the complexity of emotions? Future work might address this question by adding measures so as to flesh out the meaning of felt conflict. Also, the results here suggest that the conflict underlying the results is a subjective experience (Williams and Aaker 2002 ; study 2), purportedly created by the opposing but co-existing emotions (e.g., happiness and sadness). Follow-up work might pursue this question by manipulating mixed emotions such that they have the same valence (e.g., exciting and proud) but that are more where the mixed emotions are still complex (relative to unipolar emotions, such as exciting). Theoretically, mixed emotions of non-opposing valence should reduce the subjective experience of felt conflict, thereby moderating the results found in the current research.
In addition, future research is needed to more fully flesh out the causal chain. The high correlation between felt conflict and mixed emotions suggests that (a) the two constructs are closely located on the causal chain, and (b) other possible links between felt conflict and memory deserve examination. Three causal avenues seem particularly promising to explore. First, future research might examine the possible downstream effects of felt conflict. Felt conflict might be so aversive that individuals are motivated to resolve the conflict quickly. Hence, it may be harder to recall mixed emotional experiences because they generally do not last as long as unipolar experiences. In this explanation, feelings of conflict still drive recall bias for mixed emotions, but the consequences of felt conflict have to do with the amount of processing time. However, given that people are likewise motivated to resolve negative emotions and yet the pattern of results for negative emotions differs, this explanation is somewhat unconvincing 30 A second causal avenue to explore is based on the coping research which suggests that people engage in a primary appraisal of stressful events followed by a secondary appraisal (e.g. Folkman et al. 1986 ). For Anglo-Americans, mixed emotions could be classified as a stressful event, but not so for Asian Americans. Thus, our findings may have less to do with memory per se and more to do with the fact that people reappraise their emotions as the eliciting events fade in intensity. Furthermore, many researchers argue that felt conflict often leads to meaningful progress in sense-making, whereby memories change in positive directions as a result of finding coherence and benefit in a situation (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Larsen 1998) . Future study is needed to explicate the activated affective and cognitive constructs that lie between felt conflict and memory, and how that sense-making may differ for mixed emotional experiences than for negative emotion experiences.
A third causal path to explore would involve an examination of when mixed emotions are accurately encoded versus retrieved (e.g., Braun, Ellis, and Loftus 2001) and whether motivation (e.g., dissonance reduction) versus ability (e.g., the lack the linguistic repertoires to make sense of mixed emotions) differentially impact the recall bias. For example, although the results of our research suggests that the successful encoding of mixed emotions occurred, research would still benefit from methodologies that allow more careful study of: (a) the encoding processes, and (b) the degree to which mental taxation due to emotion complexity may result.
Nevertheless, despite such limitations, the current research yields several new insights that are particularly relevant for understanding consumer behavior. Specifically, our results speak to ongoing research in marketing suggesting that emotional experiences can fundamentally impact purchase intent as well as foster brand loyalty. For example, the amount of warmth that emanates from a brand or the fun enjoyed by a brand (e.g., iPhone) can fundamentally influence relationship trajectories (e.g., Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004) . However, in reality, most consumer-brand relationships are defined, at some point or another, by a transgression which gives rise to negative feelings among consumers. Our research suggests that the degree to which a negative event is categorized as part of a mixed experience (versus stand alone as a single negative event; Lau-Gesk 2005) influences the probability that the consumer will remember that experience and be influenced by that experience. If the transgression is mentally clumped together with positive interactions with the brand, the memory of the mixed emotional experience may indeed fade which would not be the case if the transgression stood alone as an isolated negative event.
Finally, several interesting questions arise when considering the current findings in light of past research. Are there conditions under which mixed emotional states are remembered as exactly that, mixed in nature? And, how might such insights impact the anticipation of future emotional states (Priester et al. 2006 ) and behavior? Newby-Clark and Ross (2003, study 1) showed that people spontaneously recall an affectively mixed past containing both positives and negatives. In contrast, people anticipate homogenously positive futures. Follow-up research might explore whether the memory for mixed emotions wanes when the experience is mundane or ordinary (as may be the case with the events in the current studies), but is more resistant when it is significant in meaning (Newby-Clark and Ross 2003 
